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EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS IN CALIFORNIA
CAPITAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS: WHAT ARE
THE RULES OF DISCOVERY?
Judge Joan Comparet-Cassani*
I. INTRODUCTION
The California Constitution guarantees a person, im-
properly deprived of his or her liberty, the right to petition
for a writ of habeas corpus.' The California Supreme Court
has original jurisdiction for capital cases on automatic appeal
and in any collateral proceeding.2 Sections 1473 through
1508 of the California Penal Code govern habeas petitions.3
* Judge Comparet-Cassani was appointed to the bench by Governor Pete
Wilson in 1995. She currently presides over a felony trial calendar in Long
Beach Municipal Court. Prior to her appointment, she was a deputy attorney
general in the State Attorney General's office and handled criminal appeals and
writs, including capital cases.
1. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 11.
2. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 10-11.
3. Penal Code section 1473 provides:
(a) Every person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his liberty,
under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus,
to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint.
(b) A writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited
to, the following reasons:
(1) False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the
issue of guilt or punishment was introduced against a person at any
hearing or trial relating to his incarceration; or
(2) False physical evidence, believed by a person to be factual, pro-
bative, or material on the issue of guilt, which was known by the per-
son at the time of entering a plea of guilty, which was a material factor
directly related to the plea of guilty by the person.
(c) Any allegation that the prosecution knew or should have known
of the false nature of the evidence referred to in subdivision (b) is im-
material to the prosecution of a writ of habeas corpus brought pursu-
ant to subdivision (b).
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting the
grounds for which a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted or as pre-
cluding the use of any other remedies.
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CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473 (West 1982). Penal Code section 1474 provides:
APPLICATION FOR, How MADE. Application for the writ is made by
petition, signed either by the party for whose relief it is intended, or by
some person in his behalf, and must specify:
1. That the person in whose behalf the writ is applied for is impris-
oned or restrained of his liberty, the officer or person by whom he is so
confined or restrained, and the place where, naming all the parties, if
they are known, or describing them, if they are not known;
2. If the imprisonment is alleged to be illegal, the petition must
also state in what the alleged illegality consists;
3. The petition must be verified by the oath or affirmation of the
party making the application.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1474 (West 1982). Penal Code section 1475 provides, in
relevant part:
The writ of habeas corpus may be granted in the manner provided
by law. If the writ has been granted by any court or a judge thereof
and after the hearing thereof the prisoner has been remanded, he shall
not be discharged from custody by the same or any other court of like
general jurisdiction, or by a judge of the same or any other court of like
general jurisdiction unless upon some ground not existing in fact at the
issuing of the prior writ. Should the prisoner desire to urge some point
of law not raised in the petition for or at the hearing upon the return of
the prior writ, then, in case such prior writ had been returned or re-
turnable before a superior court or a judge thereof, no writ can be is-
sued upon a second or other application except by... the Supreme
Court or some judge thereof .... In the event, however, that the prior
writ was returned or made returnable before a court of appeal or any
judge thereof, no writ can be issued upon a second or other application
except by the Supreme Court or some judge thereof, and such writ
must be made returnable before said Supreme Court or some judge
thereof.
Every application for a writ of habeas corpus must be verified, and
shall state whether any prior application or applications have been
made for a writ in regard to the same detention or restraint com-
plained of in the application, and if any such prior application or appli-
cation have been made the later application must contain a brief
statement of all proceedings had therein, or in any of them, to and in-
cluding the final order or orders made therein, or in any of them, on
appeal or otherwise.
Whenever the person applying for a writ of habeas corpus is held in
custody or restraint by any officer of any court of this state or any po-
litical subdivision thereof, or by any officer of this state, or any political
subdivision thereof, a copy of the application for such writ must in all
cases be served upon the district attorney of the county wherein such
person is in custody or restraint at least 24 hours before the time at
which said writ is made returnable and no application for such writ
can be heard without proof of such service in cases such service is re-
quired.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1475 (West 1982). Penal Code section 1477 provides:
WRIT, WHAT TO CONTAIN. The writ must be directed to the per-
son having custody of or restraining the person on whose behalf the
application is made, and must command him to have the body of such
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person before the Court or Judge before whom the writ is returnable, a
time and place therein specified.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1477 (West 1982). Penal Code section 1480 provides:
RETURN, WHAT TO CONTAIN. The person upon whom the writ
is served must state in return, plainly and unequivocally:
1. Whether he has or has not the party in his custody, or under his
power or restraint;
2. If he has the party in his custody or power, or under his re-
straint, he must state the authority and cause of such imprisonment or
restraint;
3. If the party is detained by virtue of any writ, warrant, or other
written authority, a copy thereof must be annexed to the return, and
the original produced and exhibited to the Court or Judge on the
hearing of such return;
4. If the person upon whom the writ is served had the party in his
power or custody, or under his restraint, at any time prior or subse-
quent to the date of the writ of habeas corpus, but has transferred such
custody or restraint to another, the return must state particularly to
whom, at what time and place, for what cause, and by what authority
such transfer took place;
5. The return must be signed by the person making the same, and,
except when such person is a sworn public officer, and made such re-
turn in his official capacity, it must be verified by his oath.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1480 (West 1982). Penal Code section 1481 provides:
"BODY MUST BE PRODUCED, WHEN. The person to whom the writ is di-
rected, if it is served, must bring the body of the party in his custody or under
his restraint, according to the command of the writ, except in the cases speci-
fied in the next section." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1481 (West 1982). Penal Code
section 1484 provides:
PROCEEDINGS ON THE HEARING. The party brought before
the Court or Judge, on the return of the writ, may deny or controvert
any of the material facts or matters set forth in the return or except to
the sufficiency thereof, or allege any fact to show either that his im-
prisonment detention is unlawful, or that he is entitled to his dis-
charge. The Court or Judge must thereupon proceed in a summary
way to hear such proof as may be produced against such imprisonment
or detention, or in favor of the same, and to dispose of such party as
the justice of the case may require, and have full power and authority
to require and compel the attendance of witnesses, by process of sub-
poena and attachment, and to do and perform all other acts and things
necessary to a full and fair hearing and determination of the case.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1484 (West 1982). Penal Code section 1506 provides:
An appeal may be taken to the court of appeal by the people from a
final order of a superior court made upon the return of a writ of habeas
corpus discharging a defendant or otherwise granting all or any part of
the relief sought, in all criminal cases, excepting criminal cases where
judgment of death has been rendered, and in such cases to the Su-
preme Court; and in all criminal cases where an application for a writ
of habeas corpus has been heard and determined in a court of appeal,
either the defendant or the people may apply for a hearing in the Su-
preme Court. Such appeal shall be taken and such application for
hearing in the Supreme Court shall be made in accordance with rules
to be laid down by the Judicial Council. If the people appeal from an
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Section 1484 has been interpreted to provide for evidentiary
hearings when ordered by the California Supreme Court.4
The purpose of evidentiary hearings is to decide the material
facts at issue as framed by the pleadings.' However, neither
the statute nor case law provides for discovery at these evi-
dentiary hearings. This paper will address the problems pre-
sented by the lack of discovery at these evidentiary hearings
and recommend that statutory rules for reciprocal discovery
be provided by the legislature.
Both federal and state case law provide support for the
conclusion that habeas corpus proceedings are not criminal or
civil in nature, but are quasi-civil. Federal law does not re-
quire that states provide habeas relief. Thus, when states do
provide such relief, whether discovery should be made avail-
able at such hearings is a state law issue.
This paper will recommend that the legislature enact a
discovery statute specifically drafted for habeas corpus pro-
ceedings which would provide for reciprocal discovery based
on a showing of good cause. This statute is needed because
the civil discovery statute is too broad and the criminal dis-
covery statute, by its own terms, is inapplicable to the parties
and issues in dispute in a habeas proceeding. Without this
legislation, the efficacious nature of habeas corpus will be
order granting the discharge or release of the defendant, or petition for
hearing in either the court of appeal or the Supreme Court, the defen-
dant shall be admitted to bail or released on his own recognizance or
any other conditions which the court deems just and reasonable, sub-
ject to the same limitations, terms, and conditions which are applicable
to, or may be imposed upon, a defendant who is awaiting trial. If the
order grants relief other than a discharge or release from custody, the
trial court or the court in which the appeal or petition for hearing is
pending may, upon application by the people, in its discretion, and
upon such conditions as it deems just stay the execution of the order
pending final determination of the matter.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1506 (West 1982). Penal Code section 1508(a) provides: "A
writ of habeas corpus issued by the Supreme Court or a judge thereof may be
made returnable before the issuing judge or his court, before any court of ap-
peal or judge thereof, or before any superior court or judge thereof." CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1508(a) (West 1982).
4. See CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 10-11. Original jurisdiction in capital cases is
before the California Supreme Court. Therefore, only that court may order an
evidentiary hearing. Id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1506 (West 1982). People v.
Romero, 883 P.2d 388, 393 (Cal. 1994); In re Hochberg, 471 P.2d 1, 5-6 n.4 (Cal.
1970).
5. See In re Serrano, 895 P.2d 936, 941-42 (Cal. 1995); People v. Duvall,
886 P.2d 1252, 1261 (Cal. 1995).
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thwarted. Discovery issues, such as whether discovery is
available, the scope of discovery, and the showing required
for a grant of discovery, will continue to be decided on a case
by case basis. This promotes inconsistencies in rulings,
needless re-litigation of the same issues, and as a result,
wasted court time.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Evidentiary Hearings in Capital Habeas Corpus
Proceedings
In the state of California, 503 inmates have been sen-
tenced to death and await execution on death row.6 While
the California Supreme Court reviews each inmate's auto-
matic appeals, the less familiar habeas corpus proceedings
are occurring in courtrooms across the state.7
In addition to challenging a conviction by appeal, a capi-
tal defendant may also file a petition for writ of habeas cor-
pus.8 The petition is used to raise issues which may not be
raised on appeal and which require evidentiary support not
in the appellate record.9 After considering the issues as
6. See DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, CONDEMNED INMATE LIST SUMMARY
(1998).
7. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1484 (West 1982). These hearings are some-
times referred to as "reference hearings."
8. The phrase literally means "You have the body." WILKES, FEDERAL AND
STATE POST CONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF § 2-2 at 42 (1992). "The role
that the Writ of Habeas Corpus plays is largely procedural. It does not decide
the issues and cannot itself require the release of the petitioner. Rather, the
writ commands the person having custody of the petitioner to bring the peti-
tioner before the court or judge before whom the writ is returnable .... ." Id.
(citations omitted). The Writ of Habeas Corpus gets its name from the portion
of the writ commanding the custodian to have the body (habeas corpus, in
Latin) of the detained person before the court or judge at the time specified in
the writ." People v. Romero, 883 P.2d 388, 391 & n.4 (Cal. 1994) (emphasis in
original). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1481 (West 1982). In fact, unless a
criminal defendant is in custody, habeas will not lie. See generally Moore v.
Municipal Court, 339 P.2d 196 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
9. For example, habeas corpus will not lie to review procedural irregulari-
ties, errors in law, or insufficiency of the evidence, or where the lower court
acted within its jurisdiction. 6 WITKIN & EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW §
3346, at 4149 (2d ed. 1989). Habeas corpus will not lie to retry issues of fact or
the merits of a defense and is not an available remedy "with respect to the ad-
mission or exclusion of evidence, or to correct other errors of procedure occur-
ring on the trial." In re Lindley, 177 P.2d 918, 927 (Cal. 1947).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
framed by the petition, response, and traverse,' ° the Califor-
nia Supreme Court determines whether or not the petitioner
has made a prima facie case for relief." The court then de-
cides whether petitioner's entitlement to relief depends upon
the resolution of any material facts in dispute. 2 If a resolu-
tion of material facts is required, the court orders an eviden-
tiary hearing, appoints a "referee"" to take evidence, and
specifies the issues to be addressed and resolved at the
hearing. 4
An evidentiary hearing is a trial where testimony is
taken and evidence submitted." It is, however, a very limited
trial that addresses only those issues described in the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's order. 6 Even though the evidentiary
hearing is usually held in a courtroom in superior court, the
hearing is actually "before" the California Supreme Court. 7
Few attorneys or prosecutors have handled capital ha-
beas evidentiary hearings and even fewer judges have pre-
sided over them. 8 However, the steady increase in the num-
ber of death row inmates ensures a corresponding increase in
the number of evidentiary hearings. 9 In fact, capital habeas
10. A traverse is analogous to the answer in a civil proceeding wherein the
petitioner (defendant) may deny or controvert anything stated in the return
filed by the respondent. In re Saunders, 472 P.2d 921, 923 (Cal. 1970). For a
more thorough discussion, see In re Duvall, 886 P.2d 1252, 1261 (Cal. 1995).
11. See In re Saunders, 472 P.2d at 931; In re Hochberg, 471 P.2d 1, 45 n.4
(Cal. 1970).
12. See People v. Romero, 883 P.2d 388, 393 (Cal. 1994).
13. A sitting or retired judge. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1508(a) (West 1982);
In re Hochberg, 471 P.2d at 4.
14. See In re Duvall, 886 P.2d at 1261; Romero, 883 P.2d at 393.
15. See In re Hochberg, 471 P.2d at 5-6 n.4.
16. See id.
17. Appellate courts are not equipped to have prisoners brought before
them and conduct testimonial hearings. See Romero, 883 P.2d at 393; In re
Hochberg, 471 P.2d 1, 5-6 (Cal. 1970). Therefore, the California Supreme Court
appoints a referee to take evidence and made recommendations as to the reso-
lution of disputed factual issues. Romero, 883 P.2d at 393.
18. This is based on the author's experience as a deputy attorney general
when she conducted such hearings.
19. In 1988-89, 803 original habeas petitions were filed in the California
Supreme Court. See In re Harris, 855 P.2d 391, 396 n.4 (Cal. 1993). In 1990-91,
1,022 original habeas corpus petitions were filed in the California Supreme
Court-an increase of 219 petitions. See In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 760-61 n.36
(Cal. 1993). In 1995-96, the number of capital habeas petitions had grown to
1,803-an increase of 781 petitions in five years. See discussion infra Part
II.B.4.
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petitioners may file one or more petitions for a writ of habeas
corpus." The California Supreme Court has tightened the
deadlines for filing such petitions by adopting certain rules,"'
and in some recent cases has limited the grounds for filing
successive petitions.22
Nevertheless, the motive to seek collateral review is ob-
vious. Unlike the civil litigant who is interested in an end to
litigation after a final judgment, a convicted capital defen-
dant does not have the same incentive. Therefore, the prob-
ability exists that more, rather than fewer, petitions will be
filed. In fact, statistics support this conclusion. Between
1990 and 1991, 1,022 original habeas corpus petitions were
filed in the California Supreme Court.23 That number grew to
1,803 between 1995 and 1996.24 Because of the large number
of current capital petitions, statutory rules of discovery for
habeas proceedings would promote a quicker resolution of
these pending cases and end litigation on this issue.25
As stated, one issue that has repeatedly surfaced is
whether discovery should be available to a habeas petitioner,
and if so, which discovery statute applies.26 The answer to
these questions requires a discussion of the nature of habeas
proceedings and an analysis of the fundamental difference
between criminal trial proceedings and post-conviction pro-
ceedings. Habeas corpus proceedings are quasi-civil because
they do not involve the underlying criminal conviction, but
address a claimed violation of one's civil rights. Habeas cor-
pus proceedings occur after the criminal trial and, usually,
after the appeal. The United States Constitution provides
20. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1475 (West 1982).
21. CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT, SUPREME COURT POLICIES REGARDING
CASES ARISING FROM JUDGMENT OF DEATH 585-87 (1990).
22. The court provided:
Absent justification for the failure to present all known claims in a sin-
gle timely petition for writ of habeas corpus, successive and/or un-
timely petitions will be summarily denied. The only exception to this
rule are petitions which allege facts which, if proven, would establish
that a fundamental miscarriage of justice occurred as a result of the
proceedings leading to conviction and/or sentence.
In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 760 (Cal. 1993). See also In re Harris, 855 P.2d 391
(1993).
23. See In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 761-62 n.36 (Cal. 1993).
24. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1997).
25. See discussion infra Part II.B.4.
26. See People v. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d 1159, 1202-06 (Cal. 1990).
1999]
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certain rights to a criminal defendant at trial. But these
rights do not automatically apply to a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding.27 In fact, federal law does not require that those trial
rights granted to criminal defendants be provided to petition-
ers in habeas corpus proceedings. This permits states to con-
struct habeas relief within the confines of their constitutions,
statutes, and case law. However, if discovery is granted, as
this article recommends, such discovery should be reciprocal.
In addition, it will be shown that the discovery statutes in
place are inadequate. Civil discovery, which permits inter-
rogatories, depositions, and requests for admissions are too
broad, and would result in longer habeas proceedings and
possibly an abuse of the writ. Moreover, the criminal discov-
ery statute will not work in a habeas setting since its lan-
guage is inapplicable to the parties and issues involved.
B. Habeas Corpus Is a Collateral Proceeding
1. The Writ of Habeas Corpus Is Designed to Address
Civil RightsViolations
The United States imported the Great Writ from the
English Common Law.28 The First Judiciary Act of 1789 pro-
vided in part that
[t]he several courts of the United States and the severaljustices and judges of such courts ... shall have the power
to grant Writs of Habeas Corpus in all cases where any
person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation
of the Constitution or of any treaty of the United States.29
Initially, petitions for writ of habeas corpus were limited
to challenging the jurisdiction of state courts.30 However, the
scope and function of the writ changed and expanded. The
writ now lies either where criminal proceedings have been
found unfair or to review important questions of law which
27. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
28. See People v. Romero, 883 P.2d 388, 390 (Cal. 1994).
29. The First Judiciary Act of 1789, ch.20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81-82 (1789); McCle-
sky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 477-78 (1990); Townsend v. Sain, (1963) 372 U.S. 293,
311 (1963); Exparte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886); Martin v. Hiatt, 174 F.2d 350,
351 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1949).
30. See Ex parte Long, 45 P. 1057 (Cal. 1896).
416 [Vol. 39
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could not otherwise be raised.31
The writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument
for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and
lawless state action. Its pre-eminent role is recognized by
the admonition in the Constitution: [t]he privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended. The scope
and flexibility of the writ-its capacity to reach all manner
of litigation-its ability to cut through barriers of form and
procedural mazes-have always been emphasized and
zealously guarded by courts and lawmakers. The very na-
ture of the writ demands that it be administered with the
initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscar-
riages of justice within its reach are surfaced and cor-
rected.32
Habeas is grounded on the principal that government
must always be accountable for the imprisonment of an indi-
vidual.33 Habeas lies to test proceedings so fundamentally
lawless that imprisonment pursuant to such proceedings is
not merely erroneous, but void.34
The writ of habeas corpus is brought by the petitioner to
enforce a civil right which he claims against those holding
him in custody.35 The proceeding is instituted by the peti-
tioner for his liberty and not by the government to punish
him for a crime.36 Furthermore, habeas review is concerned
not with the original judgment rendered against the peti-
tioner, but with the constitutionality and lawfulness of the
petitioner's custody.37
2. Habeas Corpus Proceedings Are Quasi-Civil
The United States Supreme Court has generally charac-
terized habeas corpus proceedings as civil in nature.38 Fur-
31. 6 B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW §
3331, at 4125, § 3346, at 4149 (2d ed. 1989).
32. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 291 (1969).
33. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1993).
34. See Exparte Royall, 117 U.S. at 245.
35. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1474 (West 1982); Ex parte Tong, 108 U.S. 556,
559-60 (1888).
36. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
37. See Ex parte Tong, 108 U.S. at 559-60; People v. Romero, 883 P.2d 388,
390-91 (Cal. 1994).
38. "Post conviction relief is even further removed from the criminal trial
than is discretionary direct review. It is not part of the criminal proceeding it-
1999]
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thermore, the California Supreme Court has characterized
habeas corpus proceedings as neither felony nor criminal pro-
ceedings. 9 Other states have held that such proceedings are
essentially civil, since the purpose of the proceeding is not to
determine guilt or innocence, but to determine whether the
person is lawfully in custody.4" Witkin also states that "it is
clear that habeas corpus proceedings are not criminal pro-
ceedings and do not come within the definition of a criminal
action."4
A petition for writ of habeas corpus neither tries a crimi-
nal charge nor has as its aim the conviction of a crime.42
Rather it is a remedy used to compel the state to comply with
constitutional guarantees.4" The issue presented by the writ
is not the petitioner's guilt or innocence, for that was decided
at trial. Therefore, the only question is whether the peti-
tioner's constitutional rights were violated.44 The fact that
habeas corpus provisions are located in the California Penal
Code is not determinative of their nature.45 Those provisions
neither define offenses, nor establish defenses.46 They do,
however, create a procedural remedy for civil violations. 7
self, and, it is in fact considered to be civil in nature." Pennsylvania v. Finley,
481 U.S. 551, 556-57 (1987). "A post conviction proceeding is not part of the
criminal process itself, but is instead a civil action designed to overturn a pre-
sumptively valid criminal judgment." Murray v. Girratano, 492 U.S. 1, 13
(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring). "It is well settled that habeas corpus is a civil
proceeding." Bowder v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 257, 269 (1978).
39. "[W]e need not involve ourselves in the parties' efforts to characterize
habeas corpus proceedings as either criminal (respondent) or civil (petitioner)."
In re Head, 721 P.2d 65, 66 n.4 (Cal. 1986). "[T]he present proceeding [writ of
habeas corpus] is not a felony proceeding." In re Weber, 523 P.2d 229, 240 (Cal.
1974). "The writ of habeas corpus, although granted to inquire into the legality
of one imprisoned in a criminal prosecution, is not a proceeding in that prosecu-
tion, but on the contrary, is an independent action instituted by the applicant to
secure his discharge from such imprisonment." France v. Superior Court, 255
P. 815, 817 (Cal. 1927).
40. See Daley v. Fitzgerald, 526 N.E.2d 131, 134 (Ill. 1998); Gibson v. Dale,
319 S.E.2d 806, 813 n.7 (W. Va. 1984); Hithe v. Nelson, 471 P.2d 596, 598 (Colo.
1970); In re Dean, 251 A.2d 347, 349 (Del. 1969).
41. 3 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 21, at 52 (3d. ed. 1998).
42. See In re Head, 721 P.2d at 69.
43. See id. at 67.
44. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 394 (1993).
45. See In re Head, 721 P.2d 65, 67 (Cal. 1986).
46. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1473-1475, 1477, 1480-1481, 1484, 1506, 1508
(West 1982).
47. See id.
1999] CAPITAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS 419
In a criminal proceeding, the government gathers evi-
dence, files charges, and attempts to overcome the presump-
tion of innocence. 48  However, it is the petitioner who initi-
ates the habeas process in an attempt to overturn a
presumptively valid judgment.49 The petitioner, as the mov-
ing party, must allege specific facts warranting relief, carry
the burden of proof, and gather whatever evidence exists in
support of his claims.5"
Even though habeas proceedings are not criminal, they
may affect one's life or liberty. Depending on the relief
sought, the remedy could involve the grant of a new trial, a
new penalty phase, commutation of the death penalty, or re-
lease from custody.51 Additionally, the court in which the pe-
tition is pending has power akin to a court of equity-to craft
an appropriate remedy.52 What remedy is appropriate in a
given case depends on "what the justice of the case may re-
quire . . ,." For these reasons, even though the petition in-
volves allegations of a civil wrong, the ultimate outcome
48. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1993); Ross v. Moffitt, 417
U.S. 600, 610-11 (1974).
49. Ross, 417 U.S. at 610-11. "A petition for writ of habeas corpus seeks to
attack a presumptively final criminal judgment ... for purposes of collateral
attack all presumptions favor the truth, accuracy and fairness of the conviction
and sentence .... We presume the regularity of proceedings that resulted in a
final judgment." In re Duvall, 886 P.2d 1252, 1258 (Cal. 1995).
Once a defendant has been afforded a fair trial and convicted of the of-
fense for which he was charged, the presumption of innocence disap-
pears. The purpose of the trial stage ... is to convert a criminal de-
fendant from a person presumed innocent to one found guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt .... Thus, in the eyes of the law, petitioner does not
come before the court as one who is "innocent," but on the contrary as
one who has been convicted by due process of law. . .
Herrera, 506 U.S. at 399.
50. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1474 (West 1982). In a habeas proceeding, the
burden of proof is on the petitioner. In re Martin, 744 P.2d 374, 391 (Cal. 1987).
The petitioner must produce evidence in support of his allegations. In re
Fields, 800 P.2d 862, 867 (Cal. 1990). The petitioner must produce this evi-
dence by a preponderance of the evidence. Curl v. Superior Court, 801 P.2d 292,
293 (Cal. 1990). "The petition should state fully and with particularity the facts
on which relief is sought ... as well as include copies of ... evidence supporting
the claim.. .. " In re Duvall, 886 P.2d at 1258.
51. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 394.
52. See In re Harris, 855 P.2d 391, 413 (Cal. 1993); McClesky v. Zant, 499
U.S. 467, 489 (1991).
53. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1484 (West 1982). See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1487,
1489 (West 1982). See In re Harris, 855 P.2d at 413.
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could affect the life and liberty of the petitioner. This charac-
teristic removes habeas proceedings from the category of pure
civil actions. Thus, because of the remedy sought and the
violation alleged, habeas proceedings are not purely criminal
proceedings. Rather, they are quasi-civil proceedings.
3. State Habeas Corpus Proceedings Are Not Mandated
by Federal Law.
State habeas proceedings are founded on state law.
States are not obligated under federal law to afford criminal
defendants collateral relief.54 Nor does the U.S. Constitution
require that a state grant a prisoner unlimited habeas corpus
or post-conviction relief proceedings." Only the right to peti-
tion the federal courts for habeas corpus relief and the right
of the federal courts to grant a petition for habeas corpus are
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution." When states do pro-
vide habeas corpus proceedings, 7 the states have substantial
discretion to develop and implement post-conviction review
since the U.S. Constitution does not dictate the exact form for
such assistance.58
As stated, state habeas corpus proceedings are quasi-civil
in nature, and are used to attack the legality of the peti-
tioner's punishment, not to inquire into any underlying
54. "States have no obligation to provide this avenue [habeas corpus] of re-
lief." Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987). "[I]t is clear that the
state need not provide any appeal at all." Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610-11
(1974); Pennsylvania, 481 U.S. at 586. "The duty of the state under our cases is
not to duplicate the legal arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal
defendant in a continuing effort to reverse his conviction. . . ." Id. at 559.
[T]he decision below rests on a premise that we are unwilling to
accept that when a state chooses to offer help to those seeking re-
lief from conviction, the Federal Constitution dictates the exact
form such assistance must assume. On the contrary, in this area
the states have substantial discretion to develop and implement
programs to aid prisoners seeking to secure post conviction re-
view.
Pennsylvania, 481 U.S. at 559. "[W]hile habeas corpus is recognized in Article
1, Section 9, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution, that provision does not
oblige the states to afford a habeas corpus remedy." In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729,
737 n.2 (1993).
55. See Pennsylvania, 481 U.S. at 557.
56. See Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475, 484-85 (1973).
57. Habeas corpus statutes have been enacted in all the United States. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 638 (5th ed. 1979).
58. See Pennsylvania, 481 U.S. at 559.
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criminal acts.
The writ of habeas corpus is the remedy which the law
gives for the enforcement of the civil right of personal lib-
erty. Resort to it sometimes becomes necessary because of
what is done to enforce laws for the punishment of crimes;
but the judicial proceeding under it is not to inquire into
the criminal act which is complained of but into the right
to liberty notwithstanding the act. The prosecution
against [the petitioner] is a criminal prosecution, but the
writ of habeas which he has obtained is not a proceeding
in that prosecution. On the contrary, it is a new suit
brought by him to enforce a civil right, which he claims, as
against those who are holding him in custody under the
criminal process. The proceeding is one instituted by him-
self for his liberty, not by the government to punish him
for his crime."9
There are several important fundamental differences be-
tween a criminal trial and post-conviction relief. For exam-
ple, fundamental constitutional rights obtain at a criminal
trial because the state must overcome the defendant's pre-
sumption of innocence to deprive him of his freedom. The
purpose of these protections is to ensure a fair trial, to allow
a defendant to prepare a defense, and to ensure a meaningful
adversary process."
Once a defendant is convicted, however, the presumption
of innocence yields to a presumptively valid conviction.6 ' Ha-
beas proceedings attack that conviction after relief has been
denied through direct review.62 It is collateral in nature be-
59. Exparte Tong, 108 U.S. 556, 559-60 (1883).
60. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects both
the right of confrontation and the right of compulsory process: In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor. Both clauses are made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398-99 (1993); Ross v. Mof-
fitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974); People v. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d 1159, 1206 (Cal.
1990).
61. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 399; Gonzalez, 800 P.2d at 1206.
62. Once a defendant has been convicted and sentenced to death, the judg-
ment and sentence is automatically appealed directly to the California Supreme
Court. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 10-11; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1239, 1506 (West
1996). Because any and all trial errors as shown in the transcript of the pro-
ceedings should be raised on appeal, that process is the direct review of the
trial in superior court. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1259 (West 1982). If that review
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cause the petitioner is not confined to his appellate record
and may submit any evidence relevant to his allegations. 3
Thus, habeas corpus is even further removed from the crime,
the trial, and the appeal and is not part of the criminal pro-
ceeding. For that reason, there is no federal requirement
that the entire array of due process protections available to a
criminal defendant be provided in habeas proceedings.64 One
is not entitled to constitutional protections in post conviction
proceedings on the basis that such protections were afforded
at the criminal trial.65 Neither the Due Process Clause,
which is concerned only with the deprivation of one's prop-
erty or liberty, nor fundamental fairness requires a different
result.66
Different proceedings implicate different constitutional
considerations. For example, a habeas petitioner does not
have either a constitutional right to the assistance of coun-
sel67 or a right to be present at habeas proceedings,68 and he is
is denied and both the judgment and sentence affirmed, the defendant may at-
tack the conviction by a petition for writ of habeas corpus, a collateral proceed-
ing. See In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729 (Cal. 1993); In re Harris, 855 P.2d 391 (Cal.
1993). However, direct appeal is the primary avenue of review in a capital case.
63. See In re McVickers, 176 P.2d 40, 47 (Cal. 1946); In re Bell, 122 P.2d 22,
35 (Cal. 1942); In re Mooney, 73 P.2d 554, 567 (Cal. 1937).
64. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 554-57 (1987). "At bottom,
the decision below rests on a premise that we are unwilling to accept-that
when a state chooses to offer help to those seeking relief from convictions, the
Federal Constitution dictates the exact form such assistance must assume." Id.
at 559. "The duty of the state under our cases is not to duplicate the legal ar-
senal that may be privately retained by a criminal defendant in a continuing
effort to reverse his conviction." Id. at 556.
65. The United States Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S.
551 (1987), explicitly rejected this theory. Fundamental fairness under the Due
Process Clause limits constitutional rights to those so enumerated. The state's
duty to a petitioner on collateral review is to assure that the petitioner has an
adequate opportunity to fairly present his claims in the context of the appellate
process. The state grant which allows habeas review is not based on the federal
Constitution. Thus the source of the right and the nature of the proceedings
are determinative. They do not require that the state duplicate those constitu-
tional rights granted to a criminal defendant at trial. See Pennsylvania, 492
U.S. at 8-10.
66. See Pennsylvania, 492 U.S. at 8-10; Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S.
545, 559 (1977); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974).
67. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755-56 (1991); Pennsylvania,
481 U.S. at 551.
68. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 20 (1963); Machibroda v.
United States, 368 U.S. 487, 495 (1962).
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not entitled to a jury trial.69 It is also likely that a habeas pe-
titioner, unlike a criminal defendant, may be called by the
people to testify," because the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination does not apply.7 In fact, if peti-
tioner refuses to testify, an adverse inference may be drawn.
72
The fact that petitioner is a capital defendant does not
alter any of these conclusions. The United States Supreme
Court has stated that the fact that the petitioner is a capital
defendant has no bearing on his procedural rights at state
habeas proceedings.73 Those safeguards afforded a capital
defendant by the Eighth Amendment at his criminal trial
provide sufficient reliability of the judgment.74 Neither the
69. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1484 (West 1998).
70. The District Attorney of the county in which the charging document,
"the information," is filed has original jurisdiction in criminal matters. CAL.
GOV'T CODE §§ 26500 (West 1998). After conviction, in a capital case on auto-
matic appeal, the State Attorney General represents the people on appeal. See
CAL. CONST. art.V, § 13; CAL. GoV'T CODE § 12524 (West 1992). The District
Attorney is to cooperate with the Attorney General. See CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1256 (West 1996).
71. A verified petition is evidence. See Estate of Nicolas, 223 Cal. Rptr. 410,
419-20 (Ct. App. 1986). California Penal Code § 1474(3) (West 1996) requires
that the petitioner verify the petition for writ of habeas corpus by oath or af-
firmation. It could be argued that petitioner thereby has waived his right not
to testify, and may even be called by the people as a witness. See infra text ac-
companying notes 186-91.
72. "Respondent's motion to dismiss denied. The referee is directed to
make findings of fact adverse to petitioner as to each question he is ordered to
answer but declines to answer on the ground of self-incrimination." See In re
Avena on Habeas Corpus, Supreme Ct. Mins. Aug. 14, 1991.
73. See Murray v. Girrantano, 492 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1989).
We have simply refused to hold that the fact that a death sentence has
been imposed requires a different standard of review on federal habeas
corpus .... We think these cases require the conclusion that the rule
of Pennsylvania v. Finley should apply no differently in capital cases
than in non-capital cases. State collateral proceedings are not consti-
tutionally required as an adjunct to the state criminal proceedings and
serve a different and more limited purpose than either the trial or ap-
peal. The additional safeguards imposed by the Eight Amendment at
the trial stage of a capital case are ... sufficient to insure the reliabil-
ity of the process by which the death penalty is imposed.
Id. We "reject the suggestion that the principles [governing procedural default]
of Wainright v. Sykes... apply any differently depending on the nature of the
penalty a state imposes for violation of its criminal laws." Smith v. Murray,
477 U.S. 527, 528 (1986) (citation omitted). "Direct appeal is the primary ave-
nue for review of a conviction or sentence; death penalty cases are no excep-
tion." Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983).
74. See Murray, 492 U.S. at 8-10.
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Eighth Amendment nor the Due Process Clause of the U.S.
Constitution "require yet another distinction between the
rights of capital defendants and those in non-capital cases."75
Thus, whether a capital habeas petitioner should be enti-
tled to discovery at an evidentiary hearing is a question of
state law." This conclusion is further buttressed by the fact
that there is no general constitutional right to discovery in a
criminal case." The rule of Brady v. Maryland"8 did not cre-
ate a constitutional right to discovery for criminal defen-
dants, but simply assured a fair trial as mandated by the
Due Process Clause by establishing minimum prosecutorial
obligations.79 The right to discovery is a trial right created by
the courts in the interest of assuring a fair trial.
4. Current Status of Discovery in Habeas Corpus
Evidentiary Hearings in California
As stated previously, a capital habeas evidentiary hear-
75. Id. at 10.
76. The author submits this conclusion necessarily follows. "A habeas peti-
tioner is not entitled to discovery as a matter of ordinary course." Bracy v.
Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997). The Federal Constitution does not confer a
general right to criminal discovery.... ." People v. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d 1159,
1204 (Cal. 1990); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 549 (1977). Rather, the
courts created discovery. See Gonzalez, 800 P.2d at 1204; Weatherford, 429 U.S.
at 549.
77. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 59-60 (1987); Weatherford, 429
U.S. at 854.
78. 373 U.S. 83, 85-87 (1963). In Brady, after the defendant had been con-
victed of first-degree murder, he learned that an accomplice who had been tried
separately had confessed, and the confession had been suppressed. Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 84 (1963). The United States Supreme Court found
that was a violation of the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. Id. at
86. It is a violation of due process when evidence material to guilt or innocence,
irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecution is withheld. Id. at 85-87.
Subsequently, in Weatherford v. Bursey, the people did not disclose the exis-
tence of an eyewitness who would testify at trial. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 558-
59. The court found that under Brady, the prosecutor was not required to make
that disclosure. Id. at 559. And, the court stated:
[T]he prosecution has the duty under the due process clause to insure
that criminal trials are fair by disclosing evidence favorable to the de-
fendant upon request .... It does not follow from the prohibition
against concealing evidence favorable to the accused that the prosecu-
tion must reveal before trial the names of all witnesses who will testify
unfavorably. There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a
criminal case and Brady did not create one.
Brady at 558-59.
79. See Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 559-60.
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ing is a trial, albeit a limited trial. As in all trials, there are
pretrial motions. Both criminal and civil statutes permit dis-
covery."0 Invariably, a capital petitioner in a habeas eviden-
tiary hearing files a motion for discovery.8' The referee must
then determine whether discovery should be permitted. Be-
cause there is no case law directly on point, or any statute
that permits discovery in this setting, the issue must be
briefed. This requires setting a briefing schedule and calen-
dar dates for formal argument. The time required to com-
plete the briefing includes factors such as research time,
preparation of papers, and the availability of all the parties
at the same time for argument. However, this does not end
the problem.
If the referee grants discovery, related issues must be
decided. For example, should discovery be reciprocal?
Should discovery be limited to the subject matter in the
criminal discovery statute,82 or should it include procedures
available under the civil discovery statute?83 Do constitu-
tional, statutory, and other privileges apply? Are statements,
writings, and interviews of the petitioner discoverable? Each
of these issues must be briefed, argued, and decided. Fur-
thermore, each of these decisions could be "appealed" by the
losing party in a sui generis motion to the California Su-
preme Court. 4
This is the current state of discovery in capital habeas
evidentiary hearings. Not only does the resolution of discov-
ery issues require an inordinate amount of time, but since
80. See infra Part III.C.
81. There are no published cases that deal with this issue and this state-
ment is based on the author's experience as a deputy attorney general when she
handled such matters. The fact that there are no published cases is not sur-
prising. Justice Lucas' explanation why there are no published cases which
deal with rulings on the merits of an exception to the sufficiency of a return to a
habeas corpus petition, are applicable. Those comments are: "The absence of a
published opinion dealing with this procedure in depth is likely due to the fact
that appellate courts usually decide such motions without an opinion. Evidence
of such action is thus found in the minutes of the court." In re Duvall, 866 P.2d
1252, 1269 n.5 (Cal. 1995). See also In re Avena on Habeas Corpus, Supreme
Ct. Mins. Aug. 14, 1991.
82. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1054 (West 1999).
83. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 2016 (West 1998).
84. See In re Avena on Habeas Corpus, Supreme Ct. Mins. Aug. 14, 1991.
"Appealed" is in quotes because the parties are actually before the Supreme
Court.
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this procedure occurs individually in each evidentiary hear-
ing, the procedure engenders and promotes a lack of uni-
formity. There is no methodology to facilitate the process
and no case law on this issue. Consequently, long hearings
are added to a proceeding that was intended to be swift. It is
a procedure that engenders lack of uniformity in rulings and
a waste of valuable court time. It is submitted that a discov-
ery statute would resolve and cure most of these problems
and, therefore, expedite the habeas proceeding.
Moreover, it is submitted that discovery has not been
foreclosed in California. The California Supreme Court dis-
cussed the issue of discovery in habeas proceedings in People
v. Gonzalez."5 In Gonzalez, the convicted defendant filed a
discovery request in the trial court even though no action was
then pending and he had not filed a petition for writ of ha-
beas corpus." Concluding that the trial court lacked jurisdic-
tion to order discovery, because there was no criminal pro-
ceeding before it, the Gonzalez court commented upon the
appropriateness of discovery in a habeas setting. 7
The Gonzalez court stated that its function did not in-
clude granting, approving, or ordering discovery.88 Citing
Cooper v. Leslie Salt, 9 the court stated that Rule 23 of the
California Rules of Court, which allows an appellant to pro-
duce additional evidence, ° does not "afford a party the facili-
ties of the appellate court for exploratory investigation to try
to develop facts sufficient to enable him to state a cause of ac-
tion."8" The Gonzalez court, in accord with Cooper, concluded
that discovery is not appropriate where habeas is used as an
investigative tool, where the petitioner has failed to state a
prima facie case for relief, or where there is no pending ac-
tion. 2
However, Gonzalez did not hold that discovery is always
85. 800 P.2d 1159, 1202-08 (Cal. 1990).
86. People v. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d 1159, 1203 (Cal. 1990).
87. Id. at 1205-08.
88. Id. at .
89. 451 P.2d 406, 413 (Cal. 1969).
90. "Proceedings for the production of additional evidence on appeal shall
be in accordance with rule 41. The court may grant or deny the application in
whole or in part ...." CAL. R. CT. 23(b).
91. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d at 1206.
92. People v. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d 1159, 1205 (Cal. 1990).
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inappropriate in the habeas setting. Rather, the California
Supreme Court found under the facts of that case that they
could not order discovery.93 The court did not foreclose the
possibility that discovery might be appropriate. In fact, it
hinted at the possibility of court ordered discovery when it
stated, "whatever role court-ordered discovery might properly
play in a habeas corpus proceeding... " in another part of
the opinion.94 Thus, the California Supreme Court did not
conclude that discovery is not available in habeas proceed-
ings. Moreover, the court's concerns about the propriety of
issuing a discovery order itself would be resolved in the ha-
beas evidentiary setting since the referee, not the court,
would make the order.95 The propriety of that grant of dis-
covery will next be discussed.
III. A STATUTE OF RECIPROCAL DISCOVERY IS NEEDED
A. Reciprocal Discovery Would Advance the Purpose of the
Evidentiary Hearing
Neither federal nor state law permits post-conviction dis-
covery without a pending petition for writ of habeas corpus."
However, once a petition has been filed and an evidentiary
hearing ordered, nothing precludes a state from providing
discovery upon an appropriate showing. Many reasons favor
granting discovery for a habeas corpus evidentiary hearing.
For example, discovery would save court time since both
sides could prepare their presentation of evidence in advance
of the hearing, which would include cross-examination of the
opponent's witnesses. Discovery would assist in deciding
which witnesses to call and determine whether expert testi-
93. Id. at 1204.
94. Id. at 1205 (emphasis added).
95. As shown earlier, appellate courts are not the appropriate forum for the
appearance of witnesses and the taking of testimony. "Because appellate courts
are ill-suited to conduct evidentiary hearings, it is customary for appellate
courts to appoint a referee to take evidence and make recommendations as to
the resolution of disputed factual issues." See People v. Romero, 883 P.2d 388,
393 (Cal. 1994). Thus, the referee sitting in a trial court in a superior court,
has the court personnel, bailiff, and security available so that the petitioner
may be present, and witnesses testify in the appropriate setting.
96. See Calderon v. United States, 98 F.3d 1102, 1106-08 (9th Cir. 1996);
Gonzalez, 800 P.2d at 1204-07.
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mony is required. It would also promote the uncovering of
perjury by providing the information necessary to investigate
claims made and thus lessen the amount of actual court time.
Once an evidentiary hearing has been ordered, the peti-
tioner has made a prima facie showing of his right to relief.97
The issues have been framed and only those issues to which
evidentiary support has already been supplied may be ad-
dressed.98 Thus, the subject area appropriate for discovery
has been clearly defined and delineated.
"The goal, however, of the procedures that govern habeas
corpus is to provide a framework in which a court can dis-
cover the truth and do justice in a timely fashion."99 One
purpose of discovery is to assist the search for truth.' An
adversary is entitled to knowledge of any unprivileged evi-
dence.' The purpose of discovery is for the parties to obtain
as much information as possible about the facts and issues
prior to the hearing.0 2 Placing both sides on an equal playing
field eliminates gamesmanship, unfair advantage, and sur-
prise.0 3 If discovery is available, cross-examination of wit-
nesses will more likely ferret out half-truths, deceptions, and
sham defenses.!0 Through discovery, facts are made avail-
able that will allow litigation to proceed more efficiently and
will educate both sides as to the other's weaknesses and ad-
vantages. This will expedite, not frustrate, the proceedings;
it will promote, not impede, the efficacious nature of the
writ.'0 '
Public policy also supports this view. The integrity of the
adversary process, the interest in the fair and efficient ad-
ministration of justice, and the truth determining function of
the trial process are promoted by permitting reciprocal dis-
covery.0 6 The integrity of the adversary process depends on
97. See In re Duvall, 886 P.2d 1252, 1258 (Cal. 1995).
98. See id.
99. People v. Duvall, 886 P.2d 1252, 1264 (Cal. 1995).
100. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 231 (1975); United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
101. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 709.
102. See id.; Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947).
103. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 411 (1987).
104. See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 411-12; Hickman, 329 U.S. at 501.
105. McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491-493 (1991); Harris v. Nelson, 394
U.S. 286, 297 (1969); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 311 (1963).
106. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 414-15.
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both the presentation of reliable evidence and the rejection of
unreliable evidence."°7 For example, access to witness inter-
views affects a party's ability to present effective cross-
examination and relevant rebuttal evidence, attack the
credibility of witnesses, impeach or rehabilitate a witness
with prior statements, and provides the ability to ferret out
perjury. °8 The outcome of a hearing should not be decided on
the testimony of witnesses who have not been as vigorously
cross-examined and as thoroughly impeached as the evidence
permits.
Telling the truth is easy. Yet, determining the truth is a
complicated business. 9 The search for the truth can be
thwarted as easily by bringing surprise testimony on an un-
suspecting opponent as by presenting perjured testimony.
Neither promotes the function of the writ."° No one has the
right to present testimony free from the legitimate demands
of the adversarial system. Nor does anyone have the right to
request relief from government oppression by presenting
half-truths."' Therefore, the integrity of the judicial function
is promoted by affording both parties discovery, because it
will facilitate the disclosure of facts and promote a fair
hearing.
To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative that the
production of evidence needed by either side be made avail-
able."' Without reciprocal discovery there is no system of
checks and balances to provide each side with sufficient in-
formation about the opponent's evidence in support of his
claims, so that verification of that support, or lack thereof,
may surface. At a criminal trial, the prosecution must pro-
vide witness lists and witness statements to the defense to
107. See id.; United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 241 (1975).
108. See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 413.
109. See id.
110. See supra Part II.
111. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 241 (1975). In Nobles, the
defense wanted to impeach two key witnesses for the people with the testimony
of the defense investigator. But the investigator's report had not been given to
the prosecutor. The District Court refused to allow the investigator to testify.
The United States Supreme Court upheld this ruling. In Taylor v. Illinois, 484
U.S. 400 (1987), as a sanction, the trial court refused to allow the testimony of a
witness whose identity was not disclosed during discovery. The United States
Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 401.
112. Nobles, 422 U. S. at 231.
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enable the full benefit of cross-examination. This enhances
the truth finding process.1
3
The same conclusion applies in an evidentiary hearing
since it is also a trial. "The trial process would be a shambles
if either side had an absolute right to control the time and
the content of witnesses' testimony." '14  Justice would be
thwarted if judgments were based on evidence not thoroughly
tested."5 Both the integrity of and public confidence in the
judicial system depend on full disclosure and development of
all the facts within the framework of the rules of evidence. 116
To ensure that justice is done, evidence must be available to
both sides. 7 "Discovery, like cross-examination, minimizes
the risk that a judgment will be predicated on incomplete,
misleading, or even deliberately fabricated testimony." 8 Any
system that would permit evidence to be withheld would cut
deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely
impair the functions of the courts."9
Additionally, the public's interest in maintaining the fair
and efficient administration of justice will be served by al-
lowing discovery in evidentiary hearings. Court time and ex-
pense will be wasted unless each party has a fair opportunity
to review and assemble the evidence. For example, without
access to the opponent's evidence, it would be impossible to
know which witnesses should be called, which questions
should or should not be asked, or whether expert opinions
might be required. Each of these would incur needless delay.
However, the right to present evidence has limitations. No
process can "function effectively without adherence to rules of
procedure that govern the orderly presentation of facts and
argument to provide each party with a fair opportunity to as-
semble and submit evidence to contradict or explain the op-
ponent's case."12°
Without discovery, a proceeding will necessarily consume
additional court time and require expenditure of more funds.
113. See id.
114. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 411.
115. See id. at 409.
116. See id.
117. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409 (1987).
118. Id. at 411-12.
119. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974).
120. Taylor, 484 U.S. 400, 411 (1987).
430 [Vol. 39
CAPITAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS
Without discovery, each side must ask questions of witnesses
in order to ferret out information that could easily be pro-
vided by an earlier exchange of information in discovery. The
court time and the expense of such proceedings are contrary
to the concept of the efficient administration of justice. Dis-
covery would accelerate the dissemination of information
that is otherwise delayed.
The potential prejudice to the truth seeking function of
the court would also be alleviated by reciprocal discovery in
the evidentiary hearings. Without discovery, judgments may
be founded on the partial or speculative presentation of
facts.'2 ' Absent privilege or confidentiality, neither party has
any valid interest in denying reciprocal access to evidence
that could cast light on the issues and promote justice.'22
If part of a discovery request involves information known
only to the petitioner and it is inextricably linked to the evi-
dentiary hearing issues, it is conceivable that the petitioner
would be compelled to furnish testimonial evidence. As a
general rule, no person may refuse to testify as a witness.'
21
However, a criminal defendant has an absolute right not to
incriminate himself and not to be called as a witness.'24 A pe-
titioner is not a criminal defendant, however, and an eviden-
tiary hearing is not a criminal proceeding. Thus, it is ques-
tionable that these same prohibitions apply to habeas
hearings. Furthermore, the petitioner must verify the peti-
tion by oath or affirmation,' 25 and provide sufficient factual
information in support of his claims.'26 This is usually
achieved by a declaration. Thus, the defendant has testified,
and the opposition should be allowed to cross-examine him on
the contents of the declaration relevant to the issues in dis-
1271V hpute. If the petitioner refuses, he can withdraw his peti-
121. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 709.
122. See id. at 411-12; accord United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230-31
(1975).
123. See Conservatorship of Bones, 234 Cal. Rptr. 724, 726 (Ct. App. 1987).
124. See id.; U.S. CONST. amend. V; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15; CAL. EVID.
CODE § 930 (West 1995).
125. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1474 (West 1982); Conservatorship of Bones,
234 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
126. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473 (West 1982). See Conservatorship of
Bones, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 726; In re Duvall, 886 P.2d 1252, 1258 (Cal. 1995).
127. People v. Madaris, 175 Cal. Rptr. 869, 872 (Ct. App. 1981). A petition
for writ of habeas corpus based on petitioner's trial counsel declaration held in-
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tion. If the petitioner invokes his Fifth Amendment right not
to testify, the referee may make adverse findings of fact on
that issue.2 ' If the petitioner does answer and furnishes in-
formation that might be incriminatory in any later criminal
proceedings, the petitioner may be offered whatever immu-
nity is required to waive the privilege, as in other proceed-
ings.
129
B. Discovery Should Be Based on Good Cause
Even though discovery would promote justice, a grant of
discovery must be based on "good cause." Good cause means
that petitioner must show that the evidence sought is mate-
rial and relevant to the pending issues, that the requested in-
formation is not in his possession and cannot be obtained
without the process of the court, and that the sought after
evidence would be admissible at the hearing.' This showing
must be based on concrete facts and not mere speculation.'
As previously noted, habeas is a remedy used to right a
wrong. 132 It is not a device for investigating possible claims,
but a means of vindicating actual claims. 3 A condemned
inmate should not be provided the means to re-litigate issues
already decided at the state trial."' Nor should a condemned
inmate be provided with a tool to "explore" in the hope that
some basis for collateral relief exists."5 That is not the pur-
sufficient. Id. See also People v. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d 1159, 1204 (Cal. 1990).
See also People v. Manson, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265, 304 (Ct. App. 1976). In re
McCarthy, 222 Cal. Rptr. 291 (Ct. App. 1986).
128. The Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against par-
ties to civil actions when they refuse to testify.
129. See supra Part II.B. See also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976);
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973).
130. See Gonzalez, 800 P.2d at 1205; In re Pratt, 170 Cal. Rptr. 80, 130 (Ct.
App. 1980).
131. See Gonzalez, 800 P.2d at 1205; In re Pratt, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
132. See supra Part II.B.
133. See People v. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d 1159, 1204 (Cal. 1990).
134. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993). "[W]hat we have to
deal with on habeas review is not the petitioner's innocence or guilt .... Id.;
accord In re Robbins, 959 P.2d 311, 315 (Cal. 1998). "It is the appeal that pro-
vides the basic and primary means for raising challenges to the fairness of the
trial." Collins, 506 U.S. at 400; accord In re Robbins, 959 P.2d at 315; Wright v.
West, 505 U.S. 277, 292 (1992). "[H]abeas corpus 'is ... not a device for re-
viewing the merits of the guilt determination... .'" Collins, 506 U.S. at 400;
accord In re Robbins, 959 P.2d at 315; West, 505 U.S. at 292.
135. See Gonzalez, 800 P.2d at 1205.
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pose of habeas proceedings. 136 An attempt to subvert the pro-
ceedings can be prevented by requiring a showing of good
cause, which would provide sufficient information for the
referee to decide whether the sought after information is ma-
terial and relevant to the issues in dispute. Otherwise, ha-
beas would provide a forum to re-litigate the state trial and
cause further delays in the implementation of the trial court's
judgment.
All intendments favor providing procedures that will en-
sure a complete and fair hearing. Both public policy and the
truth seeking function of the adversary process compel this
conclusion. Therefore, even though it is not constitutionally
required, 87 reciprocal discovery should be provided in state
habeas proceedings. Mandated reciprocal discovery would
expose the strengths and weaknesses of each side's position
and promote the development of issues. Valuable court time
and the need for continuances would be reduced. Reciprocal
discovery would result in a complete evidentiary hearing
where each party has an opportunity to present a more com-
prehensive picture of the evidence relevant to the issues in
dispute. Neither side, nor the public at large, benefits from
the judgments of proceedings where the issues are unre-
solved or inadequately explored. 3 '
Good cause would require a petitioner to show that spe-
cific facts justifying discovery, that he does not possess the
requested information, and that cannot obtain it without the
process of the court."3 9 It should not be sufficient that the
item requested is material and relevant to the issues before
the court. 4 ° Rather, a petitioner should be required to make
a threshold showing that the discovery sought would be ad-
missible at the evidentiary hearing in order to eliminate the
possibility of a fishing expedition.'
136. See supra Part II.A.
137. See supra Part II.B.3. See also Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545
(1977).
138. The federal rules provide that discovery in habeas corpus proceedings
will be had only on leave of court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1997) (governing Rule 6 of
Discovery).
139. See People v. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d 1159, 1204 (Cal. 1991); In re Pratt, 170
Cal. Rptr. 80, 130 (Ct. App. 1980).
140. See Gonzalez, 800 P.2d at 1205.
141. See id.
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Even upon a showing of good cause, the right to discov-
ery should not be absolute. It is not suggested or implied
that any party should have the absolute right to inspect any
material without regard to the adverse effects of disclosure.
The court must retain discretion to protect against the disclo-
sure of information that might violate some legitimate gov-
ernmental interest, a privilege, or confidentiality."' Litigants
have always been required to make some preliminary show-
ing, other than a mere desire for all the information in the
possession of governmental agencies, in order to obtain dis-
covery of protected or privileged information.' For example,
the dissemination of a "rap sheet," a history of one's criminal
record, specifically affects an individual's right to privacy as
guaranteed by Article 1, section 1, of the California Constitu-
tion. Accordingly, the Legislature has narrowly defined the
instances in which such information may be disseminated,"
and has established criminal sanctions for its unauthorized
dissemination.'41 Because sensitive and private information
is involved, traditionally, all doubts are resolved against dis-
closure.4 6 It is only when the sought after evidence is antici-
pated to play a major role in a defendant's case does the right
of privacy give way under the California balancing test.147
This constitutional right to privacy is not absolute and
may be narrowed only when there is a compelling and op-
posing state interest. Thus, when compelled disclosure in-
trudes on constitutionally protected areas, some qualification
has been required beyond the claim it might lead to relevant
information.'48 In addition, there are important public inter-
ests in preserving privileged official information.4 ' The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has held that disclosure of official in-
formation could be denied if it would jeopardize the
142. People v. Luttenberger, 784 P.2d 633, 645-48 (Cal. 1990). See, e.g., CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1040 (West 1995).
143. See Luttenberger, 784 P.2d at 645; City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal
Court, 776 P.2d 222, 228 (Cal. 1989).
144. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 13021, 13300 (West 1992).
145. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 13302, 13303 (West 1992).
146. See Loder v. Superior Court, 553 P.2d 624, 634 n.17 (Cal. 1976).
147. See Denari v. Superior Court, 264 Cal. Rptr. 261, 268 (Ct. App. 1989).
148. See id.




confidentiality of an investigation or reveal the identity of in-
dividuals who came forward under an express or implied as-
surance of anonymity. 5 °
There are sound public policy reasons for requiring a pe-
titioner to set forth factually specific good cause. Habeas
corpus is meant to ensure that individuals are not impris-
oned in violation of the Constitution.' Indeed, the writ has
been called "the safeguard and the palladium of our liber-
ties.""'52 If one can make a proper showing of actual inno-
cence, then a petition will lie even if there have been succes-
sive writs."3  This rule "is grounded in the equitable
discretion of habeas courts to see that federal constitutional
errors do not result in the incarceration of innocent per-
sons.""' 4 "Those few who are ultimately successful in obtain-
ing habeas relief are persons whom society has grievously
wronged and for whom [reinstated] liberation is little enough
compensation.""' When discovery is sought that is relevant to
the issue of guilt, and the accused cannot support a request
for detailed discovery without risking either self-
incrimination or a waiver of the attorney-client privilege,
there is justification for allowing the accused to set forth a
generalizedplausible justification for discovery."6 However,
when discovery is sought that is relevant only to an issue
collateral to an accused's guilt and there is no risk of self-
incrimination or waiver of privilege in justifying the discov-
ery, then a petitioner should be required to demonstrate good
cause for discovery.
150. See American Civil Liberties Union Foundation v. Deuklmejian, 651
P.2d 822, 829 (Cal. 1982).
151. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993).
152. In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 737 (Cal. 1993) (quoting In re Begerow, 65 P.
828, 829 (Cal. 1901)).
153. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404; In re Clark, 855 P.2d at 759-60.
154. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404.
155. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 634 (1993) (quoting Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391, 440-41 (1963)).
156. See People v. Ochoa, 212 Cal. Rptr. 4 (Ct. App. 1985); People v. Munici-
pal Court, 153 Cal. Rptr. 59 (Ct. App. 1979).
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C. Neither Civil nor Criminal Discovery Statutes Apply to
Habeas Proceedings
1. Arguments Against Application of Civil Statutes
Given the premise that reciprocal discovery should be
available at evidentiary hearings, the question arises
whether the civil discovery statute could be used for that
purpose. It will be shown that the procedures available in
civil discovery are inappropriate for evidentiary hearings
since they can easily be used for abuse because of their
breadth.'57 Civil discovery proceeds according to statutory
provisions.'58 Diverse methods of discovery are provided, in-
cluding procedures to obtain oral and written depositions, in-
spection of documents, physical, and mental examinations,
requests for admissions, and interrogatories.' However, the
provisions of the habeas statute require that the petitioner
name the person in "whose custody he is restrained,"6 ° the
place where he is constrained, and all parties thereto. 6'
Service must be made to the District Attorney in whose
county petitioner is bound. Thus, the Attorney General for
the State of California and the warden of the state prison,
where petitioner is incarcerated, are named parties. The
civil discovery statute provides that named parties are sub-
ject to interrogatories, depositions, and requests for admis-
sions. ' Civil discovery is available to those named in the
lawsuit, as well as to non-parties.'63 Civil discovery includes
"any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action or to the determination
of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is it-
self admissible as evidence or appears reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."'64 The result
would be a grant of discovery far beyond what is necessary
and would permit the use of the writ to investigate.
157. See Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 297 (1969).
158. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 2016-2036 (West 1998).
159. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 2019-2033.5 (West 1998).
160. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473 (West 1982).
161. See id.
162. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2019 (West 1998).
163. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2020(a)(West 1998).
164. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2017(a) (West 1998).
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If these methods were available for discovery in capital
habeas matters, both the methodology and the breadth of its
application would promote an investigative use repudiated by
the Gonzalez court. Since not only evidence relevant to the
subject matter is discoverable, but also anything likely to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, the discovery
procedure becomes a tool of investigation with which one can
explore possible violations in addition to actual violations.
The broad public interest in the timely resolution and finality
of judgments would be thwarted since these procedures ex-
tend, rather than shorten, litigation.' Parties lacking
knowledge of any facts pertinent to the resolution of the is-
sues under inquiry, such as the warden who has custody of
the petitioner, would be targets of such discovery requests.
It is for these reasons that courts have decried the appli-
cation of civil discovery to habeas petitions.'66 Justice Lucas,
writing for the California Supreme Court in Duvall, noted
that "we will not engraft on habeas corpus procedures the
myriad rules and technicalities applicable to civil proceed-
ings. ""' Furthermore, under civil discovery, unless a request
to limit discovery is made, the parties may initiate the use of
depositions or interrogatories without leave of the court.'
Use of this statutory grant could result in abuses and delay.
In the same vein, the United States Supreme Court in Harris
v. Nelson, stated that the specific provisions of the civil dis-
covery statute "are ill-suited to the special problems and
character of such proceedings."'69 The court reasoned that a
literal application of such modes of discovery would be circui-
tous, burdensome, and time consuming, concluding that such
a broad-ranged inquiry would be neither necessary nor ap-
propriate in habeas proceedings. 7 ° As the Harris court
stated:
[U]nless there is a measure of responsibility in the origi-
nator of the proceeding, the "plaintiff" or petitioner, this
165. See Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 296 (1969).
166. See People v. Duvall, 886 P.2d 1252, 1260 n.4 (Cal. 1995).
167. Id. See also Joe Z v. Superior Court, 478 P.2d 26, 28 (Cal. 1970)
(refusing to apply the rules of civil discovery to juvenile proceedings, also
"essentially civil").
168. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2019 (West 1998).
169. Harris, 394 U.S. at 296.
170. Id. at 296-97.
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procedure can be exceedingly burdensome and vexatious.
The interrogatory procedure would be available to the
prisoners themselves .... The burden upon courts, prison
officials, prosecutors and police, which is necessarily and
properly incident to the processing and adjudication of ha-
beas corpus proceedings, would be vastly increased; and
the benefit to prisoners would be counterbalanced by the
delay which the elaborate discovery procedures would
necessarily entail.171
In a footnote, the Harris court acknowledged and con-
curred with the dissent's concern for the necessity of rules in
the area of discovery in habeas corpus proceedings."2 Shortly
thereafter, Rule 6 was promulgated,'73 which provides for
procedures governing discovery in habeas cases in federal
courts. However, the state of California does not have a
comparable statute.
Without doubt, civil discovery statutes were not designed
to overturn final judgments. 74 Nor does the value inherent in
civil discovery, that of promoting settlement,7 ' operate realis-
tically in a habeas corpus setting. Therefore, the philosophi-
cal underpinnings of civil discovery would obviously thwart
the efficiency of collateral proceedings.
Lastly, the expense of civil discovery forecloses its use as
a realistic option in habeas corpus evidentiary hearings.
171. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 296-97.
172. Id. at 300-01 n.7.
173. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994). Rule 6 of 28 U.S.C. 2254 provides:
(a) Leave of court required. A party shall be entitled to invoke the
processes of discovery available under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure if, and to the extent that, the [Judge in the exercise of his dis-
cretion and for good cause shown grants leave to do so, but not other-
wise. If necessary for effective utilization of discovery procedures,
counsel shall be appointed by the [J]udge for a petitioner who qualifies
for the appointment of counsel ....
(b) Requests for discovery. Requests for discovery shall be accom-
panied by a statement of the interrogatories or requests for admission
and a list of the documents, if any, sought to be produced.
(c) Expenses. If the respondent is granted leave to take the deposi-
tion of the petitioner or any other person the [J]udge may as a condi-
tion of taking it direct that the respondent pay the expenses of travel
and subsistence and fees of counsel for the petitioner to attend the
taking of the deposition.
Id.
174. See Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 296 (1969).
175. See id.
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Payment of transcription fees, court reporters, deposition
costs, and security arrangements, added to costs already
deemed astronomical, would escalate the state's financial
burden.
2. Arguments Against Application of Criminal Statutes
Criminal discovery is also inappropriate for habeas pro-
ceedings. In 1990, Proposition 115 added the provisions for
discovery in criminal cases to the California Penal Code and
the California Constitution.'76 It is clear from the stated leg-
islative intent and from the terms used, that the discovery
statute applies solely to criminal trials. For example, section
1054(e) provides that the provisions of the discovery statute
are the exclusive means, save for constitutional require-
ments, of discovery in criminal cases.177 Section 1054.5 limits
the issuance of discovery orders in criminal cases to the
statutory provisions of the chapter.' 8 Provisions are made
for reciprocal discovery. Section 1054.1 sets forth the discov-
ery obligations of the prosecutor, which includes turning over
to defense counsel witness names and addresses and defen-
dant statements, relevant real evidence, prior felony convic-
tions of any witness, exculpatory evidence, recorded state-
ments, reports of expert witnesses, and test results. 9
Section 1054.2 provides that addresses and telephone num-
bers of either witnesses or victims may not be disclosed to a
defendant without leave of court. Section 1054.3 sets forth
the reciprocal discovery obligations of the defense to the
prosecutor. Witness names, addresses, written and recorded
statements, results of physical or mental examinations and
scientific tests, and any real evidence must be provided to the
prosecutor.'8 ° Section 1054.7 provides a work product privi-
176. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 30; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1054-1054.7 (West 1999).
177. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054(e) (West 1999).
178. Penal Code section 1054.5(a) provides:
No order requiring discovery shall be made in criminal cases except as
provided in this chapter. This chapter shall be the only means by
which the defendant may compel the disclosure or production of infor-
mation from prosecuting attorneys, law enforcement agencies which
investigated or prepared the case against the defendant ....
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.5(a) (West 1999).
179. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.1(a)-(f) (West 1999).
180. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.3(a)-(b) (West 1999).
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lege for defense attorneys and explicitly retains other privi-
leges set forth by statute or the U.S. Constitution. Finally,
section 1054.7 provides a time schedule for the disclosure of
information of at least 30 days prior to trial. However, as
shown above, both federal and state courts agree that habeas
proceedings are not criminal.
It is clear from the language of the statute that the
draftsmen did not contemplate that its provisions would be
applied to habeas corpus proceedings. Section 1054.1(b) re-
quires disclosure by the "prosecuting attorney" to include
statements of all "defendants" and reciprocal discovery by the
"defendant" is provided for in section 1054.3. However, in a
habeas proceeding these terms are simply inapplicable. For
example, there is no prosecuting attorney. The defendant is
both the petitioner and the moving party and has the burden
of proof.' The people are the defendants who must try to
uphold a presumptively valid judgment.'82 Furthermore, sev-
eral subdivisions refer to "victims,"'83 an inappropriate term
in habeas proceedings, and section 1054.1(e) requires that
the people disclose all exculpatory evidence to the defense.
Of course, such evidence is relevant to the issue of a defen-
dant's guilt or innocence, but a habeas proceeding does not
involve that issue.8 4 Therefore, this language is a further in-
dication that the draftsmen did not intend the statute to ap-
ply to habeas proceedings.
Furthermore, section 1054.3 of the California Penal Code
precludes the defendant's statements from discovery by the
prosecutor.'85 Whether this restriction would be applicable in
181. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473, 1474, 1477 (West 1982).
182. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1478, 1479, 1480, 1481 (West 1982).
183. Penal Code section 1054(d) provides: "To protect victims... from dan-
ger, harassment, and undue delay of the proceedings." CAL. PENAL CODE §
1054(d) (West 1999). The Penal Code provides "(a) [t]he prosecutor shall dis-
close to the defendant or his or her attorney ... (d) the existence of a felony
conviction of any material witness whose credibility is likely to be critical to the
outcome of the trial. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.2(a),(d) (West 1999). The Penal
Code also provides "(a) [n]o attorney may disclose or permit to be disclosed to a
defendant the address or telephone number of a victim ... ; "(b) the court shall
endeavor to protect the address and telephone number of a victim .... CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1054.2(a)-(b) (West 1999).
184. See In re Harris, 855 P.2d 391, 396 n.4 (Cal. 1993); In re Clark, 855 P.2d
729, 761 n.36 (Cal. 1993).
185. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1474(1)-(3) (West 1982).
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a capital habeas setting is questionable. As noted earlier,186
the courts appear to agree that the civil rule of an adverse in-
ference applies if the defendant refuses to testify. In the con-
text of a habeas petition, the petitioner has testified by sub-
mitting a verified application for habeas.187 By testifying, the
petitioner has waived his privilege under the Fifth Amend-
ment. '88 The Fifth Amendment protects a defendant against
being involuntarily called as a witness against himself in a
criminal proceeding.'89 But, if a defendant in a criminal trial
chooses to testify, then he, like any witness, may have his
credibility tested.' 9° On cross-examination, that same defen-
dant cannot claim his Fifth Amendment privilege not to tes-
tify on any matter reasonably related to the subject matter of
his direct testimony.' The breadth of the defendant's waiver
is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination and
not by the actual direct testimony. Therefore, section 1054.3
would be inapplicable in a habeas evidentiary hearing.
The petitioner, by virtue of his status as the moving
party of the writ, foregoes any privilege not to testify at the
evidentiary hearing.'92 When a criminal defendant files a pe-
tition for writ of habeas corpus, he voluntarily becomes a
witness. He has set forth certain facts that he claims are
true. While some of the allegations in the petition are legal,
many of the allegations are facts solely or mainly within the
petitioner's knowledge. As one who has alleged a violation of
his constitutional rights, there is no other person in a better
position to testify to the facts involved. Furthermore, once
the petitioner chooses to present the petition with his version
of the facts, he has voluntarily become a witness, placed his
186. See supra Part II.B.2, II.B.3.
187. See Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990); People v.
McCarthy, 222 Cal. Rptr. 291, 292-93 (Ct. App. 1986).
188. See United States v. Black, 767 F.2d. 1334, 1341 (9th Cir. 1985).
189. See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973).
190. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 780 (West 1998).
191. See Brown v. U.S., 356 U.S. 148 (1958); U.S. v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331,
1340 (9th Cir. 1978); People v. Cooper, 809 P.2d 865, 893 (Cal. 1991); People v.
Gates, 743 P.2d 301, 312 (Cal. 1987); People v. Ing, 422 P.2d 590, 594 (Cal.
1967).
192. In re Gray, 176 Cal. Rptr. 721, 722 (Ct. App. 1981). "Thus we hold that
there is no attorney-client privilege as to matters put in issue in a habeas cor-
pus proceeding where the competency of defendant's trial attorney is at issue."
Id.
1999] 441
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
credibility in issue, and thereby waived any protection under
the Fifth Amendment.'98 It would be anomalous to permit a
petitioner to subsequently assert the Fifth Amendment to
shield himself from testifying further on the facts and issues
he has put in dispute.'
If this were permitted, only the petitioner's side would be
presented. A petitioner would thus be permitted not only to
determine the area of inquiry, he would determine what evi-
dence would be presented and could preclude any testing of
his evidence before the court. For the petitioner to assert
that his claims are correct, his statements are true, and that
relief should be granted, while simultaneously asserting that
any attempt to verify his claims or test the truth of his
statements is precluded by the Fifth Amendment is unac-
ceptable.
[It would make] the Fifth Amendment not only a safe-
guard against judicially coerced self-disclosure but a posi-
tive invitation to mutilate the truth a party offers to
tell .... The interests ... and regard for the function of
courts of justice to ascertain the truth become relevant,
and prevail in the balance of considerations determining
the scope and limits of the privilege against self-
incrimination. 195
Procedures adopted to facilitate the orderly consideration
and disposition of habeas petitions are not legal entitlements
that a defendant has a right to pursue irrespective of the con-
tribution those procedures make toward uncovering constitu-
tional error. ' 9'
Finally, because the petitioner has placed the allegations
in the petition in dispute, he has the burden of proof.'97 Com-
193. Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodward, 523 U.S. 272 (1998).
194. Recently in Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272
(1998), the United States Supreme Court emphasized the fact that the Fifth
Amendment protects only against compelled self-incrimination. "Compulsion"
for Fifth Amendment purposes does not include a defendant's testimony or vol-
untary statement made as the result of a decision or choice generated by the
pressures of the criminal procedural system. The Court stated that "there are
undoubted pressures ... pushing the criminal defendant to testify. But it has
never been suggested that such pressures constitute 'compulsion' for Fifth
Amendment purposes." Id.
195. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 156 (1958).
196. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983).
197. See In re Fields, 800 P.2d 862, 866 (Cal. 1990); In re Martin, 744 P.2d
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parable to the assertion of an affirmative defense, the peti-
tioner must develop his claim and present proof sufficient by
a preponderance of the evidence.'98 It would appear that the
petitioner could be compelled to produce discovery of his
statements and to testify on issues he has put in dispute.
Therefore, section 1054.3(a), which limits the defendant's
duty of disclosure, would be inapplicable in a habeas pro-
ceeding. Consequently, these provisions99 apply to a criminal
trial where the determination of guilt or innocence is at is-
sue, not to the adjudication of a civil wrong. Therefore, they
are ill suited to the character and nature of habeas proceed-
ings.
When Proposition 115 was added to the California Penal
Code and the California Constitution in 1990,0 no reference
was made to the habeas corpus provisions even though they
were located in the same statute.' It is a rule of statutory
construction that the failure of the legislature to change the
law in a particular respect when the subject matter is gener-
ally before it, indicates an intent not to disturb those aspects
of the law not expressly amended."2 Even though the crimi-
nal discovery statute was added by initiative, the rule of
statutory construction still applies. Therefore, the clear
language of the statute combined with the stated intent of its
application to criminal trials,2 4 precludes its application to
habeas proceedings.
The fact that no provisions for discovery were added to
the habeas corpus provisions20' when this issue was before the
Legislature, is further indication that discovery under the
criminal statute is unavailable in those proceedings. It is
374, 390 (Cal. 1987).
198. See Curl v. Superior Court, 801 P.2d 292, 293 (Cal. 1990); In re Imbler,
387 P.2d 6,8 (Cal. 1963); CAL. EVID. CODE § 115 (West 1995).
199. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054(e) (West 1999); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1054.1-.3,
-.5-.7 (West 1999).
200. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 30.
201. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1054 (West 1999). CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1474
(West 1999).
202. See Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852, 863 (Cal. 1988); Baxter v.
Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 310 (1976).
203. See In re Lance W., 644 P.2d 744, 791-94 (Cal. 1985). In construing con-
stitutional and statutory provisions, whether by the Legislature or by initiative,
the intent of the enacting body is the paramount consideration. See id.
204. See supra notes 70, 75.
205. Added by Proposition 115, approved June 5, 1990.
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also a well established principle of statutory construction
that when the Legislature amends a statute without altering
portions of the provisions that have previously been judicially
construed, the Legislature is presumed to have acquiesced to
such judicial construction. ' °6 Thus, the fact that the provi-
sions for discovery in habeas proceedings were not added is
further indication that the criminal discovery statute does
not apply to collateral proceedings.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is submitted that these reasons provide a compelling
argument that a separate discovery statute for capital habeas
evidentiary proceedings is needed, and that it would be inap-
propriate to apply either civil or criminal discovery to such
proceedings. Concern has been raised in federal and state
legislatures that the pace of habeas litigation has negatively
impacted the judicial process and public opinion of the crimi-
nal justice system."°7 Retrying defendants after lengthy ha-
206. See Fontana Unified School District v. Burman, 793 P.2d 689, 696 (Cal.
1988).
207. In an attempt to shorten the habeas process, in 1996, Congress enacted
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1217 (1994), which applies to federal habeas challenges to state criminal
judgments. Calderon v. U.S. District Court, 98 F.3d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir. 1996).
It requires a stringent showing of innocence by clear and convincing evidence in
a successive petition or else the petition is dismissed. 28 U.S.C.A. §
2244(b)(2)(B) (West 1999). "This act was intentionally drafted 'to require ex-
traordinary showings before a state prisoner can take a second trip around the
extended district-court-to-supreme-court' federal track." Stewart v. Martinez-
Villareal, 140 L. Ed. 2d 849, 858 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Because of the "profound societal costs" that attend the exercise of habeas
jurisdiction, the United States Supreme Court has imposed "significant limits
on the discretion of federal courts to grant habeas relief." Calderon v.
Thompson, 140 L. Ed. 2d 728, 746 (1998). The Court has limited a district
court's discretion to entertain abusive writs. See McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S.
467, 487 ( 1991). The Court has limited a court's discretion to entertain proce-
durally defaulted claims. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977).
The Court has also limited a court's discretion to give retroactive application to
"new rules" in habeas cases. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308-10 (1989).
In addition, the Court has limited a court's discretion to grant habeas relief on
the basis of trial error. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993).
The Court held a recall of a mandate not controlled by the express terms of the
AEDPA was a grave abuse of discretion. See Calderon, 140 L. Ed. at 753.
"Finality [of criminal convictions] is essential to both the retributive and
the deterrent functions of criminal law. Neither innocence nor past punish-
ment can be vindicated until the final judgment is known." Calderon, 140 L.
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beas review occurs much later than do trials following rever-
sal on direct review." 8 The passage of time diminishes the
reliability of criminal adjudications. When a habeas peti-
tioner succeeds in obtaining a new trial or a new penalty
phase, the erosion of memory and loss of witnesses, which
necessarily occur with the passage of time, diminish that re-
liability.0 9 Obtaining a conviction on retrial imposes signifi-
cant social costs, additional time, and is more difficult. This
frustrates society's interest in the prompt administration of
justice. We, as a society, have a high degree of confidence in
our criminal trials because of the unparalleled protections of-
fered to a criminal defendant under our Constitution.211 Soci-
ety also has an interest in insuring that at some point a
Ed. 2d at 747 (quoting McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991)). "Without
finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect." Id.
"Finality enhances the quality of judging... and serves to preserve the federal
balance. Federal habeas review of state convictions frustrates both the state's
sovereign power to punish offenders and their good faith attempts to honor con-
stitutional rights." Id. The state bears "the significant costs of federal habeas
review." Id. "Only with real finality can the victims of crime move forward
knowing the moral judgment will be carried out." Id. "To unsettle expectations
of finality [by granting a writ after having first denied it) is to inflict a profound
injury to the powerful and legitimate interest in punishing the guilty. Id.; Her-
rera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 421 (1993). Costs imposed by appellate and col-
lateral review spanning 13 years "are as severe as any that can be imposed in
federal habeas review." Calderon, 140 L. Ed. 2d at 748. "[I]t would be the rar-
est of cases where the negligence of two judges ... is sufficient grounds to frus-
trate the interests of a state of some 32 million persons in enforcing a final
judgment in its favor." Id. at 745.
On the state level, the California Supreme Court has adopted stringent
time constraints for filing habeas petitions. See In re Duvall, 886 P.2d 1252,
1261 (Cal. 1995); In re Saunders, 472 P.2d 921, 923 (Cal. 1970); In re Lindley,
177 P.2d 918, 927 (Cal. 1947). In the companion cases, In re Clark, 855 P.2d
729 (Cal. 1993), and In re Harris, 855 P.2d 391 (Cal. 1993), the court limited
habeas review, set new standards for the grant of review and required justifica-
tion and explanation for delay, or risk a summary dismissal.
"Habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy that was not created for
the purpose of defeating or embarrassing justice but to promote
it... the availability of the writ... must be tempered by... the in-
terest of the public in the orderly and reasonably prompt implemen-
tation of its laws and to the important public interest in the finality
of judgments. For this reason, a variety of procedural rules have
been recognized that govern the proper use of the writ. .. ."
In re Robbins, 959 P.2d 311, 316 (1998). "[P]rocedural bars [are imposed] as a
means of protecting the integrity of our own appeal and habeas corpus proc-
ess." Id. at 316 n.1 (emphasis in original).
208. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993).
209. See id.
210. See id.
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criminal judgment becomes final.
A discovery statute would eliminate time consuming liti-
gation concerning the availability and scope of discovery,
thereby shortening the collateral proceeding. It would also
promote uniformity in rulings and thereby render confidence
in the outcome. Requiring that the proponent of a discovery
motion show good cause prevents the use of habeas as an in-
vestigative tool and provides the referee a standard with
which to exercise his discretion. The statute should require:
1) a written motion that describes with specificity the items
sought; 2) a statement that the item is not in the movants'
possession and cannot be obtained otherwise; 3) a statement
as to the materiality and relevance of the requested items to
the issues; 4) and a brief statement, citation, or theory of ad-
missibility.
All agree that somewhere, sometime, litigation must end.
The recommendations set forth in this article would facili-
tate, rather than forestall, the habeas process and would aid,
rather than hinder, the ascertainment of truth. Most impor-
tantly, it would assist the efficacious nature of the writ of ha-
beas corpus.
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